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This Article deals with the availability of an exemption from the registration
provisions' of the Securities Act of 1933 (the Act or Securities Act)2 for a private sale
by a holder of securities which were initially issued in a private placement 3 (restricted
securities) or of securities owned by an affiliate4 of the issuer (control securities).
"Holder" refers herein to a person who holds restricted or control securities.
"Purchaser" refers herein to a buyer of restricted or control securities from a Holder.
The Article focuses on the ordinary case when none of the securities or other
exemptions contained in section 3 of the Act 5 are applicable. It should be noted that
the anti-fraud provisions under the federal securities laws 6 provide significant
investor protection and remain applicable to all sales, even those exempt from the
Act's registration requirements.
The general question this Article addresses is how a Holder of restricted or
control securities may sell them privately without registration at a time when he could
not sell them publicly. The problem has been recognized for many years. 7 The
applicable exemption, which is gleaned by interpretation from section 4 of the Act as
an amalgam of principles underlying sections 4(1) and 4(2),8 is colloquially referred
to as "section 4(1-1/2)," although no such section appears in the Act.
The Act's statutory pattern, and the judicial and administrative precedents
accumulated over the more than half century since its adoption, provide a poor
theoretical framework for determining the precise limits of the section 4(1-1/2)
exemption. At best, the accumulated body of authority can be characterized as
unclear and full of contradictions. Some conclusions set forth herein regarding the
* Mr. Schneider is a member of the Pennsylvania Bar and is a partner of the Philadelphia law firm of Wolf,
Block, Schorr and Soils-Cohen. A.B., Cornell, 1953; LL.B., Univ. of Pennsylvania, 1956.
Mr. Schneider expresses his sincere appreciation to Sanford L. Pfeffer, a member of the Pennsylvania Bar and an
associate of Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen, for research and editorial assistance in the preparation of this Article.
1. Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1982) [hereinafter Securities Act]. See Securities Act rule 506,
17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (1987) (providing a "safe harbor" for any issuer able to meet the rule's requirements).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982 and Supp. IV 1986).
3. Securities Act § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1982).
4. See Securities Act rule 144, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(a)(1) (1987).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 77c (1982).
6. Securities Act §§ 12(l)-(2), 17(a)-(b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 771(l)-(2), 77q(a)-(b) (1982); Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982)[hereinafter Exchange Act]; Exchange Act rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240. lOb-5
(1987).
7. Discussions of the problems appear in a Report to an ABA committee, The Section "4(1-112)" Phenomenon:
Private Resales of "Restricted" Securities, 34 Bus. L.Aw. 1961 (1979) (this author provided a background paper for the
Report that established some of the terminology used therein); Olander & Jacks, The Section 4(1-112) Exemption-
Reading Between the Lines of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 SEc. REG. L.J. 339 (1988); Goldwasser, The Practitioner's
Comprehensive Guide to Rule 144, Chapter 12 (PLI 1975); Comment, Reinterpreting the "Section 4(1-112)" Exemption
from Securities Registration: The Investor Protection Requirement, 16 U.S.F. L. REy. 681 (1982).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 77(d)(1)-(2) (1982).
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precise limits of the section 4(1-1/2) exemption are supported by authority. But, as
to others, no simple answer is compelled by the available authorities, and support can
be found for a number of different conclusions. In the last analysis, at least some of
the conclusions suggested herein for the section 4(1-1/2) exemption are based
principally on this author's judgment as to how the goals and policies of the Act will
be implemented most effectively. They are offered as a proposed balance among
competing policy considerations.
To the extent that transactions are registered under the Act, investors are
protected through information disclosure and the special liability provision in section
11 of the Act. 9 But investors often derive comparable benefits under the federal
securities laws even in unregistered transactions. They have other means to obtain
reliable information. Indeed, for most publicly owned companies, essentially the full
range of registration statement information is already publicly available through
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "1934 Act" or "Exchange Act") filings. 10
Likewise, other antifraud provisions' that largely overlap the liability protections of
section 11 of the Act provide additional protection for investors.
A requirement to register securities to be sold in secondary transactions also
poses disadvantages from the overall public interest perspective. These disadvantages
must be balanced against the benefits. To the extent that Holders are restricted in
making resales, such investors lose liquidity, a valuable attribute to them. The
nonliquidity of unregistered securities will make it more costly and difficult in the
long run for companies to raise capital, an undesirable result. If registration is
required, the burdens of expense and staff time normally must be borne by issuers and
their existing investors. Accordingly, there are many circumstances when overall
public policy is best served by exempting private secondary sales from the burdens
of registration.
This Article provides answers to many recurring questions in the context of
private resales. It raises, but does not answer, some others. Regarding the
unanswered questions, it is suggested that counsel in each individual case must
exercise judgment in determining whether registration is required, based upon all of
the particular facts and circumstances. This Article is intended to provide practitio-
ners with useful guidance by focusing attention on and exploring the relevant issues
and considerations of private resales, even if no universally applicable solution to a
particular problem is offered.
Much of the law and lore in this area is based upon the response of the Securities
and Exchange Commission (the "Commission" or "SEC") to "no action letter"
requests. 12 In evaluating SEC no action responses, it should be noted that many
9. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1982).
10. Reports are filed pursuant to the Exchange Act § 13(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1982).
11. See supra note 6. See also Exchange Act § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (solicitation of proxies in violation of
rules and regulations).
12. The term "no action letter" is used generically herein to describe: (1) both favorable and unfavorable responses
to private requests for SEC Staff to recommend to the Commission that it not prosecute particular securities transactions;
and (2) Staff advisory and interpretive positions taken in response to private inquiries. No action letters are cited herein
by name of the party to whom addressed by the SEC, reporter cite (when reproduced therein), and date made available
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Commission refusals to grant no action positions may be based upon policy
considerations perceived by the SEC, rather than upon a conclusion based solely on
the legal availability of an exemption. A negative response should not necessarily be
interpreted as a legal conclusion that the law would prohibit the transaction covered
by the request, nor does a favorable position always reflect the Commission's
conclusion that the conduct is lawful. 13 Additionally, the fact that a favorable letter
recites a limitation or condition may simply reflect the terms on which the request
was made, and does not necessarily mean that a favorable response would have been
withheld absent the limitation or condition.14
II. THE STATUTORY PROBLEM
Section 4(2) exempts from registration "transactions by an issuer not involving
any public offering."' 15 It is the general exemption for so-called "private place-
ments." On its face, a sale by a Holder (a "secondary sale") is not a sale "by an
issuer." A literal reading of section 4(2) renders it inapplicable to a sale by a Holder,
and most authorities agree that section 4(2) does not exempt a Holder's private sale.16
Section 4(1) of the Act exempts from registration "transactions by any person
other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer.' 1 7 Assuming that the Holder is not a
dealer, and by hypothesis he is not an issuer, this exemption applies so long as neither
the Holder nor the Purchaser is an underwriter as the term "underwriter" is defined
in section 2(11). 18 Generally, a person is not an "underwriter" unless he acquires
securities with a view to "distribution" or is participating in a "distribution." It is
to the public, e.g., Professional Care Services, Inc., [1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,542 (Oct. 12,
1973). No action letters are available on both Lexis and Westlaw databases.
13. Regarding the Staff's position on no action letters, see Professional Care Services, Inc., [ 1973 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,542, at 83,479 (Oct. 12, 1973).
14. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Md. (avail. Feb. 22, 1988), in which the favorable letter was based on the recited
facts and the Staff enumerated specific items that should not have been necessary conditions to the availability of the
§ 4(1-1/2) exemption-e.g., the fact that the sale price of the security would be determined by appraisal. See also Capital
Facilities Corp. (avail. July 8, 1982); American Sec. Bank, [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 76,407
(May 29, 1980); Astro Mfg. Co. (avail. Jan. 15, 1979); Banner Publishers, Inc. (avail. Nov. 14, 1975).
15. 15 U.S.C. 77d (2) (1982) (emphasis added).
16. See supra note 7. See also Leiter v. Kuntz, 655 F. Supp. 725 (D. Utah 1987) (denying motion to dismiss),
which involved a sale by two 50% stockholders to a single buyer. In an analysis that is not particularly helpful, the opinion
suggests that § 4(2) might apply if all of the private placement tests are met, and also that § 4(1) might be inapplicable
on the ground that controlling persons might be "issuers" for this purpose. I disagree with both suggestions.
It has been suggested that the Holder may somehow be the "agent" of the issuer and is continuing the initial
nonpublic sale of the issuer, so that § 4(2) is applicable. However, this line of reasoning seems somewhat artificial, at
least when the Holder has purchased the security for his own account and assumed the investment risk, as opposed to
serving as a mere conduit in retransferring the securities to others. Even this line of reasoning would not apply, by its own
terms, to sales of control securities by a Holder who is an affiliate and who acquired his shares on the open market.
On the other hand, if a direct purchaser in an issuer's proper § 4(2) private placement purchases securities with the
explicit purpose of serving as a conduit from the issuer to other buyers, i.e., as the issuer's private placement
"underwriter," it would seem reasonable to treat the issuer's § 4(2) exemption as applying to the intermediary's private
resale. North Elkhorn Co. (avail. Nov. 30, 1987) (favorable letter in which, as part of a restructuring, partnerships
purchased shares of a surviving corporation in exchange for partnerships' assets, for the purpose of immediately
distributing the shares to their partners--performing, in effect, as underwriters in a private placement). See Fuller v.
Dilbert, 32 F.R.D. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (purchaser in a secondary private sale could designate persons to share in his
purchase obligation, so long as he did so in a manner not resulting in a distribution).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1) (1982).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1982).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
generally accepted that the term "distribution" in section 2(11) is essentially
synonymous with "public offering" as used in section 4(2).19
Although section 4(1) is the exemption applicable to most open market or public
transactions by individual security holders who hold neither control nor restricted
securities, this section does not by its terms preclude reliance thereon for private sales
by security holders who cannot or choose not to make public sales. The better
reasoned authorities conclude that section 4(1) exempts a private secondary sale of
restricted or control securities that are sold privately when they cannot be sold
publicly.20 But such an exempt sale under section 4(1) must have some of the private
sale characteristics associated with section 4(2) in order to avoid having the selling
Holder become an underwriter, for whom section 4(1) is unavailable. 21 It has become
common, therefore, to refer to the exemption as "section 4(1-1/2)."
Regulation D22 provides a safe harbor exemption from the registration require-
ments for private placements. It applies by its terms only to sales by an issuer, and
therefore is inapplicable to private sales by a Holder. Regulation D supplies useful
guidance, however, to the extent that a section 4(1-1/2) sale should be modeled after
a private sale by an issuer. The policies reflected in the American Law Institute (ALI)
Federal Securities Code also provide useful guidance. 23
The SEC Staff positions on precisely which exemption applies to private
secondary sales are less than satisfactory. An important SEC release acknowledges
the existence of the section 4(1-1/2) exemption which it characterizes as a "hybrid
exemption not specifically provided for in the 1933 Act but clearly within its intended
purpose... so long as some of the established criteria for sales under both Section
4(1) and Section 4(2) ... are satisfied.'24 Over time, the Staff has taken a variety
of positions and nonpositions.25
19. But see Applicability of Broker-Dealer Registration to Banks, Exchange Act Release No. 22,205, [1984-1985
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,800, at 87,589 n.58 (July 1, 1985); Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 627 F. Supp. 695, 709 n.12 (D.D.C. 1986).
20. McDaniel v. Compania Miners Mar De Cortes, S.A., 528 F. Supp. 152 (D. Ariz. 1981); Neuwirth Inv. Fund,
Ltd. v. Swanton, 422 F. Supp. 1187 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (in which the Holder was a broker-dealer); Value Line Fund, Inc.
v. Marcus, [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,523 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1965). Other cases,
however, seem to treat § 4(2) as the exemption applicable to a private resale of outstanding securities by an existing
security holder. See, e.g., Swenson v. Engelstad, 626 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding the exemption unavailable on the
facts).
21. Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896 (1959); United States v.
Sherwood, 175 F. Supp. 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
22. Securities Act rules 501 to 506, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.506 (1987).
23. American Law Institute, FED. SEc. CoDE (1980).
24. Employee Benefit Plans, Securities Act Release No. 6188, 45 Fed. Reg. 8960, 8977 n.178 (Feb. 1, 1980).
Candela Laser Corp., [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 178,530 (Oct. 28, 1987); and Re Rule 145 (avail. April
23, 1981), discussed in Staff Acknowledges Availability of Section 4(1-112) Exemption, VI Corporate Counsel 7 (No. 3,
May-June 1981), also acknowledges the existence of Section 4(1-1/2).
25. While the Staff has granted no action letters touching upon § 4(1-1/2) matters, it has as a matter of policy
declined to interpret that exemption on other occasions. Optelecom, Inc. (avail. Apr. 5, 1982), discussed in StaffDeclines
to Issue Advice on Hybrid § 4(1-112) Registration Exemption, 14 Sec. REo. & L. REP. 667 (No. 15, Apr. 16, 1982) (citing
Procedures Utilized by the Division of Corporation Finance for Rendering Informal Advice, Securities Act Release No.
6253, 45 Fed. Reg. 72,644 (Oct. 28, 1980), which indicates that the Staff will no longer express views on this general
area).
Some Staff positions have stated that § 4(2) applies. See Gralla Publications, Inc. (avail. Feb. 18, 1977); Mary
Elizabeth Sealander (avail. Sept. 19, 1977); Colorado & W. Properties, Inc., Danielson Turnpike Properties, Inc. (avail.
July 14, 1977). But cf. Harris, Beech and Wilcox, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,773 (Apr.
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mE. REQUIREMENTS OF A PRIVATE SALE OF RESTRICrED OR CONTROL SECURMES
Set forth below are suggested guidelines applicable to section 4(1-1/2) sales. 26
Unless otherwise stated, the following discussion assumes that a Holder wishing to
sell privately would be unable to make an unregistered public sale at the time.2 7 A
Holder who is free to make an unregistered public sale in reliance on section 4(1)
should be free to make a private sale as well in reliance on that exemption, without
any of the further limitations imposed by section 4(1-1/2).28 To illustrate, if a Holder
who was never an affiliate of the issuer acquired securities in a private placement ten
14, 1972); Gadsby and Hannah, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,006 (Sept. 8, 1972); Karl
Ehmer, Inc. (avail. May 9, 1975, reconsid. avail. July 17, 1975); Environmental Sciences Corp., [1973 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,466 (July 30, 1973).
For several years, the SEC Staff has been discussing publicly various projects addressing resale issues, including the
§ 4(1-1/2) exemption. Apparently abandoning a more comprehensive project, it has been recently reported that the Staff
is working on a more modest proposed rule (sometimes referred to by the Staff as "Rule 144A"), relating to institutional
purchases of unregistered securities. Apparently such a rule will not address the broad range of § 4(1-1/2) issues, but the
covering release may provide useful guidance on issues not covered by the rule itself.
On November 22, 1987, Linda C. Quinn, Director of the Division of Corporation Finance, delivered an address to
an ABA committee entitled: "Redefining 'Public Offering or Distribution' for Today." This address raised a number of
conceptual problems dealing with resales in a variety of contexts, including § 4(1-1/2), which was described as a
"phantom" exemption.
While he was still Chief Counsel to the Division of Corporation Finance, Peter J. Romeo distributed an outline, dated
March 30, 1984, of remarks presented at an April 7, 1984 ABA meeting, captioned "Resales Outside of Rule 144." The
outline presented his personal views that had not been reviewed by the Commission, relating to a comprehensive statement
of policy concerning resales. It touched on a number of § 4(1-1/2) issues and other issues. Staff members have referred
to Mr. Romeo's outline from time to time, but the Staff is no longer actively considering as broad a safe harbor rule as
Mr. Romeo contemplated.
Rule 144, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1987), specifies in a nonexelusive manner those persons who are deemed not to be
engaged in a distribution and, therefore, not underwriters in making public sales. In specifying the numerical limitation
on shares that may be sold, rule 144(e)(3)(G), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(e)(3)(vii) (1987) excludes the amount of securities
sold privately from the permitted amount of public resales. As originally adopted, this subparagraph excluded securities
sold: "pursuant to an... exemption provided by Section 4(2) .. .- 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(e)(3)(G) (1973)(emphasis
added), amended by 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(e)(3)(vii) (1987). In 1974, the wording was changed, and the exclusion now
covers: "a transaction exempt pursuant to section 4 of the Act and not involving any public offering .. " 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.144(e)(3)(vii) (1987) (emphasis added).
The foregoing amendment to this provision was not published for comments under the Administrative Procedure Act.
The following statement appeared in the release promulgating the change in language from the original reference to § 4(2):
The amendment, which changes the reference from Section 4(2) to a transaction exempt pursuant to Section 4
of the Act, and not involving any public offering, reflects the Commission's original intent in adopting the rule,
as well as subsequent staff interpretations. Since this is an interpretative amendment for purposes of
clarification, the Commission does not find it necessary to publish the amendment for comment pursuant to the
Administrative Procedure Act.
Adoption of Amendment to Rule 144, Securities Act Release No. 5452, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 79,633 (Feb. 1, 1974) (emphasis added).
Note that the Commission fails to designate in rule 144 any particular subsection of § 4, but the final clause of the
amended provision--"and not involving any public offering.. ."---tracks § 4(2) exactly. Is the Commission's "original
intent" relevant? Is the matter now "clarified"?
26. Except as noted with respect to disclosure, it is suggested that substantially similar principles should apply to
secondary sales by Holders who are controlling persons and by noncontrolling Holders who own restricted securities.
There are some differences, however, in applying the integration principle. Sales by a noncontrolling Holder who has
recently purchased restricted securities from the issuer may be subject to integration with all other related sales made
directly by the issuer, and also with other direct and remote sales deriving through other related first tier private placees.
On the other hand, if the Holder is a controlling person who does not have restricted securities (i.e., he does not have
securities recently sold to him privately by the issuer), the sale to the Purchaser might have to be integrated with other
sales tracing directly or indirectly back to the particular selling Holder. But, absent concerted action between such selling
Holder and other sellers, it would not be necessary to integrate sales by the particular Holder with sales by the issuer or
by any other Holder.
27. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
28. See Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461, 466 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896 (1959); ValueLine
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years earlier, he would have completely free stock which he could sell publicly,
without limitation, in reliance on section 4(1). Simply because such Holder may elect
to sell the securities in a private transaction, there should be no additional section
4(1-1/2) type restrictions or obligations applying to his sale, or to his buyer's right to
resell.
A. Limitations on the Number of Purchasers
A Holder should limit the number of Purchasers from him to relatively few.
Setting aside for the moment questions of integrating sales by other persons with
those of the Holder, a Holder should be permitted to sell safely to twenty-five
persons, a commonly recognized rule of thumb limit for private placements outside
of the safe harbor provided by Regulation D and its predecessor, rule 146 (now
repealed). 29 One wonders if the number can be as large as thirty-five persons, with
aggregation of closely related persons counting as one for this purpose (plus an
unlimited number of "accredited" Purchasers), as permitted by Regulation D.
Assuming no prearranged or concerted action, may each participant in a private
placement resell to the same number of Purchasers? Obviously "pyramiding" is a
potential problem. If each participant in a private placement could resell privately to
only a few other Purchasers, and each of those Purchasers could resell privately in
turn to a few additional persons, the total number of Holders could increase rapidly
by geometric progression to a very large number. Accordingly, the right to resell of
each participant in a private placement should be limited to some extent by the sales
of other participants within a relevant time period. This is the general approach of the
ALI Federal Securities Code.30 Normal integration principles should apply. It might
be appropriate for the buyers in a private placement to agree among themselves how
resales will be handled, just as they might agree how jointly held registration rights
will be exercised.
B. Method of Sale
The customary method of sale for private placements, including the restrictions
on general solicitation and advertising, should apply to section 4(1-1/2) sales.31
Purchasers may be solicited directly by the Holder or through intermediaries. 32
Income Fund, Inc. v. Marcus, [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 91,523, at 94, 953 (S.D.N.Y.
1965).
29. While no action letters typically involve a single Purchaser, multiple Purchasers are sometimes involved. See,
e.g., Karl Ehmer, Inc. (avail. May 9, 1975, reconsid. avail. July 17, 1975) (8 Purchasers); Elwill Dev., Ltd. (reconsid.
avail. Jan. 17, 1975) (5 Purchasers).
30. Compare § 202(41)(B)(i) of the American Law Institute, Fan. SEC. CODs (1980), defining "'limited offering,"
the functional successor to a § 4(2) private placement. It would expressly permit private resales by private placees so long
as the resales do not result in more than 35 owners (with exceptions) at any one time within three years after the last sale
by the issuer. As the Code's resale right is structured, a Holder who sold all of his securities could be replaced by his
Purchaser, without any increase resulting in the number of owners at any one time. That is, if each person sold all of his
securities to one other person, there could be an unlimited number of successor resales without causing any increase in
the number of owners that had to be counted in applying the 35 owner limit at any one time.
31. Cf. Securities Act rule 502(c), 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (1987).
32. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (avail. May 17, 1976). The manner through which intermediaries identify
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The question arises: To what extent may an available block of securities be
publicly advertised when the block is to be sold to one Purchaser or a limited group
of Purchasers, e.g., advertised publicly to meet Uniform Commercial Code
requirements?33 Favorable no action letters often involve a large number of offerees,
including public auctions or public advertising, so long as the entire block of
securities is to be sold to a single Purchaser or very limited group.3
C. Disclosure
What must the Holder disclose in a section 4(1-1/2) sale? I believe the answer
should depend upon the Holder's status as an insider and also upon his access
to material information that is unavailable to the Purchaser. The discussion
below focuses solely on any disclosures that may be required under section 4(1-1/2) in
order to avoid violating the Act's registration provisions. Of course, the general
antifraud provisions remain applicable, and they might well require extensive
disclosure to a Purchaser under circumstances when there are no separate disclosures
required to establish the section 4(1-1/2) exemption as such. Thus, a Purchaser in a
private secondary transaction who has been defrauded by inadequate or deficient
disclosure could have a perfectly adequate remedy under the antifraud provisions,
whether or not he has a separate remedy for violation of the Act's registration
provisions.
If the Holder is an insider having access to nonpublic information, it would
appear prudent for the Holder to make disclosures comparable to the disclosure
required of an issuer in a section 4(2) or Regulation D transaction, except to the extent
that the Purchaser is already aware of the information.
If the Holder is not an insider and has no material inside information, the Holder
should not be required to make any disclosures to the Purchaser about the issuer. If
there is information publicly available about the issuer, it would appear prudent for
the Holder to advise an uninformed Purchaser where and how such information can
prospects may raise questions involving the presence of general solicitation and advertising. See Arthur M. Borden,
[1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,344 (Sept. 15, 1977).
33. See U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1977). See also First Nat'l Bank of Md. (avail. Feb. 22, 1988); Capital Facilities Corp.
(avail. July 8, 1982); American Sec. Bank, [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) V 76,407 (May 29, 1980);
Astro Mfg. Co. (avail. Jan. 15, 1979); Banner Publishers, Inc. (avail. Nov. 14, 1975).
34. Lapeer County Bank & Trust Co. (avail. Oct. 27, 1986); Republic Bank of Oklahoma City (avail. Dec. 1,
1986); Adventure Campers, Inc. (avail. Jan. 10, 1974); Illinois Capital Inv. Corp. (avail. Apr. 14, 1975); American
Telecommunications Corp. (avail. June 25, 1976); Banner Publishers, Inc. (avail. Nov. 14, 1975); York Terrace Lessee
Venture (avail. Dec. l, 1975); David E. Wise, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,738 (Sept.
17, 1976); United Properties of Am., [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 81,627 (June 9, 1978).
Madison Plaza Ass'n (avail. Jan. 8, 1988) involved a default by at least 15 limited partners who failed to pay the
notes given in payment for their limited partnership interests. A no-action position was granted allowing the partnership
to publicly advertise the units in a foreclosure sale under the Uniform Commercial Code. A recited term of sale was that
the units of each defaulting partner would be sold as a block to only one purchaser, which would permit a total of at least
15 separate purchasers. Since the resale of the defaulted units was by the issuing partnership itself, the transaction was
a primary offering to which § 4(2) was applicable, rather than a secondary offering, but there is no reason to believe that
the Commission would have reached a different result on the number of permitted purchasers if the foreclosure sale had
been a secondary one for the account of a nonissuer holding a lien on the units.
Another term of sale was that prospective purchasers would be furnished with information "on request" concerning
the financial condition of the partnership.
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be obtained, 35 but the Holder should not be obligated to assemble the information for
the benefit of the Purchaser.
If the Holder is not an insider, but does have material nonpublic information
about the issuer, or if he has ready access to such information, he should disclose to
the Purchaser whatever material information the Holder has or can readily obtain.36
The Purchaser should be advised, unless the fact is apparent from the circumstances,
that the Holder is not in a position to warrant the current accuracy of the information
supplied or that the Purchaser is receiving all existing material information. The
Holder might wish to have the Purchaser acknowledge expressly that the Purchaser
is not relying on the Holder as an information source beyond such information as is
actually disclosed.
If the Holder does disclose to the Purchaser material nonpublic information
about a publicly owned issuer, the Holder, for his own protection, should extract the
Purchaser's covenant not to trade further in the public market on the basis (or possibly
while in possession) of the nonpublic information. 37 Otherwise, the Holder might
under certain circumstances become a tipper, thereby committing an insider trading
violation of the antifraud prohibitions, if his tippee (the Purchaser) engages in
improper trading based upon (or while in possession of) the disclosed information. 38
If the issuer is a publicly owned company with current reports under the 1934
Act, 39 it is doubtful whether a noninsider Holder must make any additional
disclosures, except to the extent that he has material adverse information which
would prohibit his sale without disclosure under general antifraud provisions. Some
Staff letters suggest that Purchasers be limited to those with access to information
about the issuer,40 but this should not be a necessary condition as a matter of law.
More recently, Staff members advise informally that they would not impose such a
requirement.
Apart from any issuer-related disclosure, the Holder should make appropriate
disclosure to a Purchaser that the securities are unregistered and will be restricted in
the Purchaser's hands.
35. See Adventure Campers, Inc. (avail. Jan. 10, 1974); Land & Leisure, Inc.; Hanover Inv., Inc. (avail. Apr. I,
1976). This step should not be necessary if it is clear that the Purchaser is already aware of publicly available information
sources. Thus, when an experienced institutional Purchaser buys of a large publicly owned company, its awareness of
reports filed with the SEC may be presumed and the Holder should be under no duty to advise the Purchaser of such
information source.
36. David E. Wise, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 80,738 (Sept. 17, 1976); York
Terrace Lessee Venture (avail. Dec. 11, 1975). If a Holder has a contractual or other right to obtain information from the
issuer, it would be prudent for the Holder to exercise that right and pass on the information so received from the issuer.
37. Under circumstances when the Holder is legally obligated to restrict the Purchaser's further trading, the
Purchaser would most likely be aware of his own legal obligation to refrain from further trading independent of any
contractual undertakings. If the Purchaser does violate the law by improper trading, however, the Holder would no doubt
be in a better position to avoid his own liability by showing that he took reasonable steps to prevent improper use of the
information that he disclosed in confidence to the Purchaser.
38. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
39. Reports are filed pursuant to the Exchange Act § 13(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1982).
40. See, e.g., Investors Mortgage Group, Inc. (avail. Feb. 9, 1976) (taking a position that harks back to the SEC's
controversial brief in SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co., 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972)).
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D. Qualification of Purchasers or Offerees
A recurring question is whether Purchasers (or offerees) in a section 4(1-1/2)
sale must meet any self-fending, risk bearing, or sophistication tests that are
applicable under section 4(2) and/or rule 506. Assuming, arguendo, that such
requirements exist under section 4(2), a proposition that can be debated,4' I believe
that such requirements should not be imposed under section 4(1-1/2). On the other
hand, courts may be more likely to impose the Purchaser qualification requirements
if the Holder is a control person of the issuer, in contrast to a private placee who is
simply a passive outside owner of restricted securities. There is a tendency to equate
controlling shareholders with issuers for this purpose.42 Most favorable no action
letters in the section 4(1-1/2) context do not reflect any information on the
sophistication or risk bearing capability of the Purchasers or offerees, and the SEC
Staff seems to require no showing in this regard as a general matter. 43
E. Holding Period or Investment Intent Before a Holder or Purchaser Can Resell
Must a Holder of restricted securities establish any holding period before he can
make a private resale? Absent an integration or pyramiding problem that results in a
distribution, and assuming that the Holder is not functioning as a mere conduit for
passing securities to others, there should be no specific holding period requirement
imposed before a Holder may resell.44
41. There is fairly compelling support for the view that there are no purchaser qualification requirements (apart
from access to information) under the self-implementing § 4(2) exemption. Rather, these requirements were introduced
by the SEC in the safe harbors of Regulation D and its predecessor rule 146, as part of a tradeoff for relaxing other § 4(2)
limitations. See Swenson v. Engelstad, 626 F.2d 421, 425-26 (5th Cir. 1980); Doran v. Petroleum Management Corp.,
545 F.2d 893, 904 (5th Cir. 1977); Woolf v. S.D. Cohn & Co., 515 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded on
other grounds, 426 U.S. 944 (1976). These precedents are analyzed in Schneider, The Statutory Law of Private
Placements, 14 Rav. SEc. REG. 869, 874-75 (1981). After all, the basic protection of the Security Act's registration
provisions lies in disclosure, and not in protecting inappropriate purchasers from their own analytic or economic
incapacity.
42. Cf. Securities Act § 2(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1982).
43. There are, however, a few refusals to grant no-action requests that note the absence of information about the
Purchasers and/or offerees or suggest that they must have rule 506 type qualifications. Gralla Publications, Inc. (avail.
Feb. 18, 1977); Mary Elizabeth Sealander (avail. Sept. 19, 1977); Colorado & W. Properties, Inc., Danielson Turnpike
Properties, Inc. (avail. July 14, 1977); York Terrace Lessee Venture (avail. Dec. I1, 1975).
44. See Value Line Fund, Inc. v. Marcus, [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,523
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1965); Fuller v. Dilbert, 32 F.R.D. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
If the nonaffiliated Holder holds the securities long enough, he may make his own public sale under § 4(1), and
the private characteristics of a § 4(1-1/2) transaction become unnecessary. See also rule 144(k), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(k)
(1987). Therefore, a Holder's holding period is highly relevant in determining whether § 4(1) applies.
Although good arguments can be made that successive nonaffiliate private Holders should be permitted to tack their
holding periods for this purpose, current law and SEC interpretation do not generally permit tacking holding periods
before and after a § 4(1-12) sale. If the Holder is an affiliate, he would be unable to sell his securities freely no matter
how long his holding period, so the argument in favor of tacking would be somewhat weaker when the Holder is an
affiliate. See Candela Laser Corp., [Current Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,530 (Oct. 28, 1987) (sale by an
affiliate Holder who had held fifteen years was exempt by § 4(1-112), but the securities were restricted in Purchaser's
hands). Special interpretations, which may give benefits similar to tacking, relate to resales of securities issued to
employee benefit plans. Employee Benefit Plans, Securities Act Release No. 6281, 46 Fed. Reg. 8446 (Jan. 15, 1981);
Employee Benefit Plans, Securities Act Release No. 6188, 45 Fed. Reg. 8962 (Feb. 1, 1980); Resale of Securities Issued
Pursuant to Employee's Stock Plan, Securities Act Release No. 5750, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 80,766 (Oct. 8, 1976).
A special interpretive problem has arisen in the context of minimumlmaximum or "all or none" private placements,
in which a person associated with the sponsor or the offering broker wishes to purchase remaining securities in a sufficient
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Must a Holder of restricted stock, or a Purchaser in a section 4(1-1/2) sale, have
any form of investment intent? As a theoretical matter, a Holder's or Purchaser's
resale would appear to be exempt so long as neither the Holder nor the Purchaser is
participating in a "public offering," as that term is used in section 4(2), or is acting
as an "underwriter" which in turn involves a "distribution," as those terms are used
in section 2(1 1). Thus, there would appear to be no reason to preclude an intent (or
at least reservation of the right) to make further private resales by the initial Holder
or his Purchaser, absent a pyramiding problem that results in a public offering from
a series of purportedly integrated private sales. The only limitations that should apply
are: (1) to preclude resales in the public market, until some other exemption becomes
applicable (e.g., section 4(1) pursuant to the safe harbor of rule 144); and (2) to
preclude a public distribution resulting in fact from too many successive private
resales.
As a practical matter, however, to avoid the pyramiding problem, it would seem
appropriate for the Holder to extract from the Purchaser some form of "investment"
(or at least nondistribution) representation, especially if a trading market exists for the
security. The Purchaser's investment representation is sometimes noted as a term of
the sale in favorable no action letters. 45
Apart from any expression of investment (or nondistribution) intent, must the
Purchaser have any specific holding period after his purchase from the Holder before
he may make further private resales? Must the securities "come to rest" (whatever
that often used phrase may mean) in the Purchaser's hands? Is it relevant to determine
whether the Purchaser has the full investment risk or, alternatively, whether he is
somehow protected against that risk-e.g., by having a "put" back to the Holder, or
by having given the Holder a nonrecourse note secured only by the security
purchased?
If neither the transaction by which the Purchaser buys or the one by which he
later resells is part of a public offering or distribution, there would appear to be no
reason to require the Purchaser to have held the security for any period of time in
order to qualify the private Purchaser's resale for a further section 4(1-1/2)
exemption. In short, the general principles applicable to a Holder should apply to said
Purchaser, with such Purchaser being, in essence, a new "Holder" in connection
with his own later section 4(1-1/2) sale. Of course, resales by the Purchaser within
close time proximity of his purchase, absent some explanation, may cast doubt on the
bona fides of his original purchase and may suggest that he is serving as a mere
amount to complete the offering. In Securities Act Release No. 6455, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,045 (Mar. 3, 1983), interpreting
Regulation D, the answer to question 79 indicates that such purchases "must be for investment and not resale"-
apparently precluding private as well as public resales. The basis for this limitation is said to be Exchange Act rule lOb-9,
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-9 (1987). See also Timothy M. Homer, [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH)
78,194 (Oct. 16, 1985). This general interpretive approach has been challenged on the basis that, if the initial purchaser
actually pays for the securities and assumes the investment risk, he should be able to resell the securities privately, so long
as the overall transaction (including resales) does not (1) result in a distribution or public offering in violation of § 4(2),
or (2) constitute the initial purchaser as an underwriter.
45. Mid-Continent Energy Corp. (avail. Dec. 22, 1976); Illinois Capital Inv. Corp. (avail. Apr. 14, 1975).
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conduit between the seller to him and the buyer(s) from him. (Shades of the
unlamented pre-rule 144 "change of circumstances" doctrine!)46
On the other hand, to permit a Purchaser's bona fide resales after a short holding
period by him raises a potential pyramiding problem-a public offering resulting in
fact from too many integratable successive private resales in a too short period of
time. Accordingly, I believe that a Purchaser should have no holding period
requirement before he can make his own section 4(1-1/2) resales if, but only if, the
entire series of integratable private transactions taken together does not constitute a
public offering/distribution.
What obligation has the Holder to assure, and thereafter police, the nondistri-
bution of the securities by the Purchaser? Should restrictive legends or stop transfer
instructions to the transfer agent be used? Must the issuer comply with the Holder's
request to use either or both techniques, since only the issuer can give binding
instructions to the transfer agent or place legends on certificates newly issued to the
Purchaser? Must the issuer independently insist that either or both techniques be used,
if the Holder does not?
In terms of procedure, if there is or is likely to be any trading market for the
security, 47 it would be prudent for the Holder to request that the issuer place a
restrictive legend on the certificate or other document representing the securities in
the hands of the Purchaser, and that stop transfer instructions be given if there is a
transfer agent. Presumably, issuers generally would be willing to comply with these
requests, although it is theoretically possible that an issuer might decline to accept the
burden in limited circumstances. 48
F. Type and Amount of Security and Nature of Purchaser
In theory, neither the type of security, the amount of the security sold, nor the
nature of the Purchaser should be germane in determining whether section 4(1-1/2)
applies, but these factors may be of some practical relevance in situations in which
the law is unclear-especially when dealing with risky securities and unsophisticated
Purchasers. With respect to the amount of securities to be sold, it is clear that section
4(1-1/2) does not impose quantitative limits comparable to rule 144's one percent or
46. See Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461,462-68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896 (1959) (court
refused to allow change of circumstance defense when change was reasonably foreseeable at time of purchase); see also
T. HAzEN, THE LAw OF SEcuRrnis REGULAr/ON 146-47 (1985); L. Loss, FutDAIENhrALs OF SEcuRnTms REGULATION 357-66
(1988).
47. Practice varies regarding legends relating to nonregistration under the Act for securities of private companies.
The overwhelming number of companies in the United States are privately owned, with no expectation of becoming
publicly owned in the foreseeable future. Most such companies probably do not routinely legend securities regarding their
nonregistered status under the Act.
48. The SEC takes the position that, in order to preserve the § 4(2) exemption upon which the issuer has relied,
the issuer must police its own private placements against improper redistribution. But this rationale does not apply when
the Holder is an affiliate who acquired shares on the open market. Nonetheless, many companies consider it prudent to
place legends on stock held by affiliates, even if the stock was unrestricted when the affiliate acquired it through open
market purchases.
Should the issuer involve itself in any disclosures which are made by the Holder to the Purchaser? Probably yes, if
the Holder is an affiliate. Probably no (except to confirm compliance with SEC reporting requirements, if applicable), if
the Holder is not an affiliate or other type of insider.
1988]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
average weekly trading volume tests. 49 On the other hand, a relatively large amount
of securities to be sold may be a factor that influences the SEC's Staff to deny a no
action position.
With respect to the type of security and nature of Purchaser, a no action letter
dealing with a proposed noninstitutional sale of relatively risky equity securities noted
as a positive factor that the sale would be made only to a "financially sophisticated
[purchaser] who can afford the risk.' '50 On the other hand, a major portion of the total
financing by U.S. companies is accomplished through the private sale of debt
securities to institutions in relatively large blocks. Although these securities typically
are held to maturity, the right of one institution to sell large blocks of debt securities
to another without registration has never been seriously questioned. The secondary
institutional market for privately placed debt securities has special characteristics, and
there is a flexibility commonly accepted in practice that may not apply to
noninstitutional resales of equity securities.5 1
G. Fungibility
If a Holder owns both restricted and nonrestricted securities of the same class
and he makes a private sale, can he take the position that he has divested himself of
the restricted securities? If so, must he be able to trace the particular securities sold
(e.g., by certificate numbers) as being identifiable restricted securities?
The more enlightened approach would apply the fungibility concept, recogniz-
ing that for relevant securities laws purposes all securities of the same class are
fungible, but use the concept to the Holder's advantage, not his disadvantage. That
is, without the need to trace particular securities (tracing may have adverse tax or
other consequences to the Holder personally), the Holder should be permitted, at his
election, to designate his public sales as having come from his securities that can be
sold publicly, and his private section 4(1-1/2) sales as coming from his securities that
cannot be sold publicly. This approach, allowing a Holder to use fungibility to his
advantage, is reflected in rule 144 and the ALI Federal Securities Code. 52
49. Securities Act rule 144(e), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(e) (1987).
50. York Terrace Lessee Venture (avail. Dec. 11, 1975).
51. See Resales by Institutional Investors of Debt Securities Acquired in Private Placements, 34 Bus. LAw. 1927
(1979) (ABA position paper).
The American Stock Exchange has filed proposed rules with the SEC to create a new division of the exchange called
System for Institutional Trading of Unregistered Securities ("SITUS"). SITUS would create a U.S. market limited to
institutional investors as participants, for trading unregistered blocks of debt or equity securities of large, high-grade,
nonreporting foreign issuers. SEC File No. SR-Amex-87-32 (Dec. 23, 1987). If the rules are approved, SITUS would
become, in effect, an exchange market for § 4(1-1/2) sales to institutional buyers. Though the particular proposal relates
to foreign securities, if the SEC approves the concept it might well apply to securities issued by domestic companies as
well.
52. Securities Act rule 144(e)(3)(G), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(e)(3)(vii) (1987); American Law Institute, FED. Sac.
CODE § 202(41)(B)(ix) (1980 & 2d Supp. 1981). Cf. Interpretations of Rule 144, Securities Act Release No. 5306,
[1972-1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,000, at 82,157 (Sept. 26, 1972).
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H. The Holder's Status as a Dealer
If the Holder of restricted securities happens to be a dealer in securities, literally
neither section 4(1) nor section 4(2) would ever apply, even if the dealer sold the
securities through another broker-dealer, since the transaction would "involve" a
dealer. It would seem unduly harsh, however, to preclude a Holder who happens to
be a dealer from ever making a private secondary sale under section 4(1-1/2). I feel
confident that there should be a basis for a proper private resale by a Holder of
restricted securities who happens to be a dealer.5 3 Possibly the sale should be
considered exempt on the rationale that, with respect to the particular investment, the
Holder is not acting as a "dealer" for this purpose.
I. A Working "Rule of Thumb"
The preceding analysis raises many questions that are not fully answered. The
following is offered, however, as a safe harbor test, in the sense that Holders should
have section 4(1-1/2) available if the test is met:
Resales by a buyer in an issuer's private placement are exempt under section
4(1-1/2) if: (1) the issuer could have sold the securities directly to all of the direct
buyers from it as well as all of the remote buyers who purchase from the direct buyers
from it (or from any intermediate buyer), without losing the section 4(2) exemption,
assuming with respect to remote buyers the inapplicability of any offeree qualification
requirements and taking into account the aggregate number of ultimate buyers, the
manner of sale to each, and the time period during which the sales occur; and (2) each
person who resells discloses to the buyer from him the material information about the
issuer known or reasonably available to the seller and not known or reasonably
available to the buyer from such seller. No offeree qualification tests need be met by
buyers who do not buy directly from the issuer, assuming that the intervening
buyer-reseller has made a bona fide purchase for his own account, and is not serving
merely as an intended conduit for a sale by the issuer indirectly to the ultimate buyer.
Illustration: An issuer sells to two first tier buyers in a private placement. Shortly
thereafter, each first tier buyer sells a part of his holdings to two additional persons,
increasing by four the total number of buyers to six. Shortly thereafter, each of the
four second tier buyers sells a part of his holdings to four additional persons, increasing
the total number of buyers by another sixteen to twenty-two. Each first tier buyer has
the ability to understand and assume the investment risk. The issuer made adequate
disclosure to the first tier buyers, and each reseller disclosed the material information
available to him to his buyer. There are no further resales of the securities.
Analysis: Viewing the entire series of sales and resales as an integrated
transaction, no distribution or public offering has occurred. No purchaser making
resales is an underwriter. Every direct and remote buyer could have participated in the
initial private placement as a direct buyer from the issuer without loss of the section
4(2) exemption, assuming that any purchaser qualification tests that may apply to the
53. See Neuwirth Inv. Fund, Ltd. v. Swanton, 422 F. Supp. 1187 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (in which the Holder was a
broker-dealer). See also supra note 14.
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issuer's sale are inapplicable to a Holder's sale.54 Therefore, the section 4(1-1/2)
exemption should apply to all of the resales by the first tier or second tier buyers.
I hasten to emphasize that the foregoing is suggested solely as a nonexclusive
safe harbor test-a clear case. No inference should be drawn that section 4(1-1/2)
would necessarily be inapplicable if this safe harbor test were not met.
J. Other Possible Exemptions for Private Resales
If the Holder has securities that may be sold freely under an exemption other
than section 4(1-1/2), he should be able to pass completely free securities to a
Purchaser in a private sale made on a basis consistent with such applicable
exemption, but without complying with the additional restrictions of section 4(1-1/2).
The following possibilities are worthy of consideration:
The intrastate offering exemption contained in section 3(a)(11) 55 of the Act has
been interpreted by the SEC as applying to affiliates if the exemption would have
been available to the issuer, and an affiliate selling in reliance on the exemption need
not be a resident of the state in question. 56 Presumably, the same principle should
apply to a secondary sale by a nonresident Holder who is not an affiliate, assuming
that the issuer's earlier private sale to the Holder would not be subject to integration
as part of the same transaction with the Holder's later intrastate resales.
If a nonaffiliate Holder has held the securities for more than three years, the
securities are likely to be, as a practical matter, completely free of further restriction
in the hands of the Holder under rule 144(k). If privately placed securities have been
held by a nonaffiliate Holder for a long period of time (e.g., over five years), the
Holder should be able to establish that section 4(1) applies, apart from rule 144, and
that the securities are unrestricted in his hands.
The Securities Act registration requirements are inapplicable if a Holder's sale
is accomplished without any use of the jurisdictional means,57 although improper
integratable resales through the jurisdictional means by the Purchaser may ultimately
involve the prior Holder in a violation.
IV. AN APPROPRIATE RESPONSE FROM THE COMMISSION
The Commission has been urged to give guidance in the section 4(1-1/2) area
through rulemaking or an interpretive release.5 8 While there has been a project
54. See supra note 41. So long as the first tier buyers are purchasing in good faith for their own accounts, and not
as mere conduits between the issuer and more remote buyers, I believe as a matter of policy that the buyer qualification
requirements should be inapplicable.
55. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (1982). Preliminary Note 4 to rule 147, 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1987), a safe harbor rule
under § 3(a)(1 1), makes the rule inapplicable to secondary sales.
56. Exemption for Local Offerings from Registration, Securities Act Release No. 4434, 26 Fed. Reg. 11,896,
11,897 (Dec. 6, 1961). But compare Grenader v. Spitz, 390 F. Supp. 1112 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd on other grounds,
537 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1976), which can be read to suggest (incorrectly, I believe) that an issuer's controlling person must
also reside in the jurisdiction for § 3(a)(1 1) to be available. Preliminary Note 4 to rule 147 expressly makes that safe harbor
rule inapplicable to nonissuer transactions.
57. Section 5 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1982), applies only if the sale makes use of the mails, or the
means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce.
58. See Olander & Jacks, supra note 7.
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underway in this area for a number of years, it is apparently the intention of the
present Staff to adopt a rather modest safe harbor rule dealing only with private sales
of securities to institutions, without addressing section 4(1-1/2) issues more
broadly.59
I recommend that the Commission do nothing to address section 4(1-1/2) issues
generally, apart from (1) actions taken on a particular set of facts (e.g., in litigation
or in response to a no-action request), and (2) its current plan with respect to
institutional purchases. I come to this conclusion for the reason that the issues are so
complex and interrelated, and can arise in such varied factual settings, that the
Commission is not likely to give in the abstract any definitive or even helpful
guidance beyond those clear cases in which no help from the Commission is required.
It would be preferable to let the law develop, at the administrative and judicial level,
on a case-by-case basis.
With respect to registration exemptions, experience teaches that some (although
by no means all) so-called safe harbor rules are drawn so restrictively that they give
comfort only in extremely limited circumstances when the law is completely clear in
any event. Indeed, by suggesting highly restrictive standards, such safe harbors tend
to be counterproductive from the viewpoint of those hoping to rely on the
exemptions. 60 Such standards tend to spill over as an interpretive matter, potentially
leading courts to narrow the exemptions contained in self-implementing statutory
provisions by incorporating the safe harbor rule limitations. I fear that any rulemaking
or general interpretive "help" from the SEC in the section 4(1-1/2) area would be so
limited as to be counterproductive in this sense.
V. CONCLUSION
Congress intended to protect investors through the disclosure mandated by the
registration process in certain transactions. On the other hand, it is clear that the vast
majority of securities transactions are intended to be exempt. Two of the major
exemptions apply to private sales by issuers, covered by section 4(2), and public or
private sales that do not involve a distribution by or for the benefit of the issuer or a
controlling person. The latter are covered by section 4(1). It would defeat the overall
purpose of the statutory scheme to restrict secondary sales unduly by an overly
expansive reading of the terms "underwriter" or "public offering" so as to render
59. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
60. A classic example is rule 147, 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1987), creating a safe harbor in connection with the
intrastate offering exemption of § 3(a)(l 1), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(1 1) (1982). To qualify for the safe harbor, an issuer must
meet each of three separate 80% tests with respect to the jurisdiction in which it is making the offering relating to gross
revenue, location of assets, and use of proceeds. The Securities Act itself requires simply that the issuer be "doing
business" within the jurisdiction. As an appropriate interpretive gloss, the courts have confined the exemption to local
financings by local businesses, and have required that the issuer have substantial or predominent business activities in the
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Chapman v. Dunn, 414 F.2d 153, 159 (6th Cir. 1969); SEC v. McDonald Inv. Co., 343 F. Supp.
343 (D. Minn. 1972). This interpretative requirement could be met if thejurisdiction in question was more significant than
any other, even though it represented less than a majority of the issuer's business (however business was to be measured).
A majority of the business being local should certainly suffice under the prerule 147 judicial interpretations of § 3(a)(1 I).
Prior to the adoption of rule 147, there was no precedent whatsoever for requiring that the local activities meet anything
like the three-pronged 80% test in rule 147.
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section 4(1) unavailable to private secondary transactions. The capital raising ability
of both public and private companies would be impaired if their existing security
holders were unreasonably restricted in making private resales. Similarly, a require-
ment that particular secondary sales be registered will ultimately impose additional
costs and burdens on issuers, to the detriment of their other shareholders.
Accordingly, it is suggested that some reasonable balance must be struck in
order to permit unregistered private secondary sales under circumstances when the
Holder could not make public sales. This Article has attempted to suggest practical
guidelines in establishing that balance.
